Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWFC 288 (B)

Case No: GU25P07191

IN THE FAMILY COURT
SITTING IN GUILDFORD

Date: 09/09/2026

Before

DISTRICT JUDGE PAUL BISHOP

- -

Re C (A Child) (Dismissal at FHDRA: mother in prison)

Between:

S	**Applicant**
- and -	
Z	**Respondent**

- -
- -

Mr Alex McHugh acting pro bono (instructed by Not Beyond Redemption) for the **Applicant**
Ms Sophie Kay (instructed by **Ms Tatjana Williamson** of Peacock & Co Solicitors) for the **Respondent**

Hearing date: 10 July 2026

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JUDGMENT

This judgment was given in private. The judge gives permission for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of this judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court

DISTRICT JUDGE PAUL BISHOP:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an adjourned First Hearing Dispute Resolution Appointment (FHDRA) in a case concerning a child, C, who is three years old. Her parents were married before the birth of C. The mother, who is anonymised to 'S' in the judgment title but referred to as 'M' for mother in this judgment, made an application for a Child Arrangements Order, issued on 16 June 2025. She also applies by Form C2 to rely on contact centre reports. M attended the hearing by video-link from prison.

2. The father, who is anonymised to 'Z' but referred to as 'F' for father in this judgment, was deemed by Magistrates at the first FHDRA to have made applications for a Prohibited Steps Order (PSO) to prohibit M from removing C from his care or from the care of anyone to whom he has entrusted C's care; a Specific Issue Order (SIO) to unilaterally decide upon C's primary school; and for summary dismissal of M's application (as recommended by Cafcass in these proceedings). In June 2026, F made a further application by C2 for an order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989, such that M would have to apply for leave (permission) before making any further applications for five years.

3. Magistrates at the first FHDRA in March 2026 ordered witness statements from the parties on the issue of dismissal and reallocated the FHDRA to a District Judge. They made an interim order that C live with F.

4. Both parties were represented by experienced counsel. Both parties had produced the directed statements and their counsel provided detailed and helpful written arguments which they were permitted to expand upon in oral submissions. The hearing having been 90 minutes in a busy list, judgment was reserved.

BACKGROUND

5. C currently lives with F and has no contact with M. M states she was previously C's primary carer. F does not agree and states that he has been C's sole carer since M's arrest in 2024, in addition to having had 6 months of paternity leave when C was born. M had been having consistent in-person contact at a contact centre (paid for by F) prior to her custodial sentence beginning in 2025.

6. M pleaded guilty to several serious domestic abuse offences. The victim in each case was F. I note M strangled F in the presence of C in the bathroom during bath-time, and threatened F with a bladed knife, pursuing him from room to room. She was sentenced to 39 months custody. M is subject to a restraining order prohibiting her from contacting F for 14 years (save via solicitors or the Child Maintenance Service, or as directed by the Family Court or Social Services).

7. C was present in the parties' home during all of these incidents and the criminal court therefore deemed her a victim of M's domestic abuse in addition to F. The criminal court judge in his sentencing remarks noted the severe impact on F of M's domestic abuse and noted M's limited insight and continued blame of F and his family. In the present proceedings she continued to assert that she is the victim when speaking to Cafcass.

POSITIONS

8. M seeks indirect contact with C whilst in prison by: video/phone contact; sending and receiving letters/cards; and sending audio/video recordings of M reading stories for C to hear. She seeks a roadmap to unsupervised shared care after her release. M had sought direct contact in her application, seeking that C be brought to the prison, but this was not pursued at the hearing before me.

9. M accepts there are practical difficulties and that F cannot be expected to participate in these indirect forms of contact as a victim of domestic abuse. She offers no third-party to facilitate.

10. M seeks a report under section 7 of the Children Act such that Cafcass might consider C's wishes and feelings and give recommendations about contact arrangements. In the alternative, M seeks a final hearing. M submits that dismissing her case at this point will cause greater harm to C in the long-run.

11. M does not oppose an order that C lives with F, for the time being at least, or the PSO and SIO that F seeks. She seeks that any section 91(14) order expire upon M's release from prison, or 12-18 months later.

12. F does not oppose M's application in respect of the contact centre notes, which I have seen and are positive. He opposes any contact as not being in C's best interests and asks the court to consider a 'no contact' order. He says any contact would place both C and himself at significant risk of harm. In relation to indirect contact, given C's age, F would have to read letters/cards to C, which he says would further his trauma, as would hearing M's voice in recordings of stories and video/phone calls. He does not have any suitable third parties who are willing to facilitate such indirect contact.

13. F seeks that M complete a Domestic Abuse Perpetrators Programme (DAPP), anger management and parenting courses before any further application is made. M accepted that she would need to complete a ~26 week Respect accredited DAPP. M's counsel at the first FHDRA suggested that a psychological assessment of M may also be sought.

EVIDENCE

14. Cafcass in their safeguarding letter comment that: "*[M] struggles to understand the impact of domestic abuse on [C] given that she would have been present during all these incidents, whether she was asleep at the time or not, the seriousness of the incidents placed [C] at significant risk of physical and emotional harm. In my view [M] is going to need more focused intervention such as attendance at a Domestic Violence Perpetrators Programme before we could look at progressing arrangements.*" They recommend that M should complete a DAPP before making a further application to the court to progress to a section 7 report to look at the longer-term arrangements for C, but did not suggest that the then ongoing professionally supervised contact should stop.

15. Following the sentencing hearing, Cafcass recommend that the mother's application should be dismissed and that the mother might "*reapply once she has left prison and undertaken sufficient work to address her offending behaviour*."

16. I also have the benefit of a Child and Family Assessment (CAFA) by the relevant Local Authority (LA), dated February 2025 and completed in response to the incidents leading to M's conviction. The LA visited the home and raised no concerns about the home environment or F's care of C.

17. M told Cafcass that she "*doesn't know how to manage her anger or how to talk calmly [and] struggles with severe anxiety*." M's statement states that she has reflected on her abuse and how she has progressed since beginning her prison sentence. A letter from her Prison Offender Manager reports that she has demonstrated exemplary behaviour in prison and is an enhanced prisoner.

18. M has undertaken anger management and mental health work in prison and has been referred to a parenting course, and other courses (although not a DAPP, which I understand she is unlikely to be able to begin until released from prison). She also reports being referred by her GP for help in relation to anxiety and anger management.

19. F has engaged with therapy in order to help process what has happened to him and C (although no further therapy appears to be planned). He reports having found the previous supervised contact stressful and anxiety inducing and suggests that M continued her control of F through the supervised contact. In his statement his says "*Writing this statement, reading her statements and hearing her voice in court all are triggering and opening up wounds, causing more trauma and leaving me unable to move on; I am constantly having to re-live these horrendous ordeals, writing them down, speaking to lawyers, professionals, social workers etc also causes a constant impact on my mental health triggering more anxiety and upset. … All of this takes an extreme toll on me, emotionally, psychologically and financially*."

LAW

Welfare

20. Section 1 of the Children Act 1989 requires C's welfare to be the court's paramount consideration. The court must also have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining the application for a child arrangements order is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child. The court must not make a child arrangements order unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all.

21. The court is to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of a parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child's welfare, if that parent can be involved in the child's life in a way that does not put the child at risk of suffering harm.

22. In making an order under section 8 of the Act, a court shall have regard in particular to the factors set out in section 1(3), the 'welfare checklist':

"*(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding);*

(b) his physical, emotional and educational needs;

(c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;

(d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant;

(e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs; and

(g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question."

Domestic abuse

23. Practice Direction 12J (PD12J) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR) is engaged as F and C have experienced domestic abuse perpetrated by M. Paragraph 4 sets out the general principles:

"*Domestic abuse is harmful to children, and/or puts children at risk of harm, including where they are victims of domestic abuse for example by witnessing one of their parents being violent or abusive to the other parent, or living in a home in which domestic abuse is perpetrated (even if the child is too young to be conscious of the behaviour). Children may suffer direct physical, psychological and/or emotional harm from living with and being victims of domestic abuse, and may also suffer harm indirectly where the domestic abuse impairs the parenting capacity of either or both of their parents.*"

24. I note that the court must (paragraphs 5, 36 and 37 in relevant part):

i) Consider the nature of any allegation, admission or evidence of domestic abuse, and the extent to which it would be likely to be relevant in deciding whether to make a child arrangements order and, if so, in what terms.

ii) Ensure that where domestic abuse is admitted or proven, any child arrangements order in place protects the safety and wellbeing of the child and the parent with whom the child is living, does not expose either of them to the risk of further harm and is in the best interest of the child.

iii) Apply the individual matters in the welfare checklist with reference to the domestic abuse which has occurred and any expert risk assessment obtained. In particular, the court should in every case consider any harm:

a) which the child as a victim of domestic abuse, and the parent with whom the child is living, has suffered as a consequence of that domestic abuse; and

b) which the child and the parent with whom the child is living is at risk of suffering, if a child arrangements order is made.

iv) Only make an order for contact if it is satisfied:

a) that the physical and emotional safety of the child and the parent with whom the child is living can, as far as possible, be secured before, during

and after contact; and

b) that the parent with whom the child is living will not be subjected to further domestic abuse by the other parent.

v) Consider the conduct of both parents towards each other and towards the child and the impact of the same. In particular, the court should consider:

a) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and on the arrangements for where the child is living;

b) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and its effect on the child's relationship with the parents;

c) whether the parent is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against the other parent;

d) the likely behaviour during contact of the parent against whom findings are made and its effect on the child; and

e) the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse.

vi) In every case where a finding or admission of domestic abuse is made, or where domestic abuse is otherwise established, the court should consider whether an order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 would be appropriate.

Dismissal

25. Rule 1.1 FPR sets out the 'overriding objective' of the Family Procedure Rules to deal with cases justly, having regard to any welfare issues involving. This includes:

"*(a) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly;*

(b) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the nature, importance and complexity of the issues;

(c) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing;

(d) saving expense; and

(e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court's resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases."

26. Rule 1.2 FPR requires that the court must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it exercises any power given to it by these rules, or interprets any rule.

27. The court has a broad discretion in Children Act proceedings to end proceedings before a final hearing provided it is determined to be in accordance with the child's welfare. In *Re C (Children) (Residence Order: Application being dismissed at the Fact Finding*

Stage) [2012] EWCA Civ 1489, Sir James Munby made the following observations about case management in family cases:

"*14. .... It has long been recognised - and authority need not be quoted for this proposition - that for this reason a judge exercising the family jurisdiction has a much broader discretion than he would in the civil jurisdiction to determine the way in which an application of the kind being made by the father should be pursued. In an appropriate case he can summarily dismiss the application as being, if not groundless, lacking enough merit to justify pursuing the matter. He may determine that the matter is one to be dealt with on the basis of written evidence and oral submissions without the need for oral evidence. ...*

15. The judge in such a situation will always be concerned to ask himself: is there some solid reason in the interests of the children why I should embark upon, or, having embarked upon, why I should continue exploring the matters which one or other of the parents seeks to raise. If there is or may be solid advantage in the children in doing so, then the inquiry will proceed, albeit it may be on the basis of submissions rather than oral evidence. But if the judge is satisfied that no advantage to the children is going to be obtained by continuing the investigation further, then it is perfectly within his case management powers and the proper exercises of his discretion so to decide and to determine that the proceedings should go no further.

28. In *Re A, B and C (Child Arrangements: Final Order At Dispute Resolution Appointment)* [2025] EWCA Civ 55) the Court of Appeal applied *Re C* with reference to FPR Practice Direction 12B, which requires the court at the Dispute Resolution Hearing (DRA) to identify the key issues (if any) to be determined and the extent to which those issues can be resolved or narrowed at the DRA and to consider whether the DRA can be used as a final hearing. Baker LJ, giving the leading judgment, confirmed that "*even where the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the court has the power to bring the proceedings to an end if satisfied that such a course is consistent with the welfare of the children.*" In *Re A, B and C* there had been previous proceedings relatively recently in which judges had made orders after delivering judgments following contested hearings.

29. In *DP v PC* [2017] EWHC 2387 (Fam), Baker LJ upheld an appeal against summary dismissal of a second application where the first had been withdrawn without full hearing. The reason for the successful appeal was that the first-instance judge had erred by principally considering whether or not there had been any change of circumstances since the last proceedings, in a case where there had not been a "*contested hearing relatively recently at which the issues have been properly and fully ventilated*", where such an approach would be appropriate. Further, the first-instance judge had not considered some of the earlier reports, which recommended direct contact, and failed to consider the welfare of the children more broadly.

Section 91(14)

30. Section 91(14) of the Children Act sets out that, "*On disposing of any application for an order under this Act, the court may (whether or not it makes any other order in response to the application) order that no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court.*"

31. Section 91A provides further provisions (inserted by the Domestic Abuse Act 2021), in particular:

"*(2) The circumstances in which the court may make a section 91(14) order include, among others, where the court is satisfied that the making of an application for an order under this Act of a specified kind by any person who is to be named in the section 91(14) order would put—*

(a) the child concerned, or

(b) another individual ("the relevant individual"),

at risk of harm.

… (4) Where a person who is named in a section 91(14) order applies for leave to make an application of a specified kind, the court must, in determining whether to grant leave, consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made."

32. Practice Direction 12Q FPR sets out key principles of section 91(14) orders, including in relevant part:

"*(2.1) Section 91(14) orders are available to prevent a person from making future applications under the 1989 Act without leave of the court. They are a protective filter made by the court, in the interests of children.*

(2.2) The court has a discretion to determine the circumstances in which an order would be appropriate. These circumstances may be many and varied. They include circumstances where an application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm (as provided in section 91A), such as psychological or emotional harm. The welfare of the child is paramount.

(2.3) These circumstances can also include where one party has made repeated and unreasonable applications; where a period of respite is needed following litigation; where a period of time is needed for certain actions to be taken for the protection of the child or other person; or where a person's conduct overall is such that an order is merited to protect the welfare of the child directly, or indirectly due to damaging effects on a parent carer. Such conduct could include harassment, or other oppressive or distressing behaviour beyond or within the proceedings including via social media and e-mail, and via third parties. Such conduct might also constitute domestic abuse.

(2.4) A future application could also be part of a pattern of coercive or controlling behaviour or other domestic abuse toward the victim, such that a section 91(14) order is also merited due to the risk of harm to the child or other individual.

(2.7) Section 91(14) orders are a protective filter – not a bar on applications – and there is considerable scope for their use in appropriate cases. Proceedings under the 1989 Act should not be used as a means of harassment or coercive control, or further abuse against a victim of domestic abuse or other person, and the court should therefore give due consideration to whether a future application would have such an impact.

(4.1) Sections 91(14) and 91A are silent on the duration of a section 91(14) order. The court therefore has a discretion as to the appropriate duration of the order. Any time limit imposed should be proportionate to the harm it is seeking to avoid. If the court decides to make a section 91(14) order, the court should explain its reasons for the duration ordered."

33. In *Ms X v Mr Y* [2023] EWHC 3170 (Fam), Lieven J (as she then was) considered a section 91(14) order for 5 years to be proportionate "*to allow the M to have a complete break for that period, and for any future court to consider whether the F has changed his understanding of his behaviour and or his actions once released from prison …*". The judge ordered no contact in that case on facts closely aligned to the present case. The father was convicted of controlling and coercive behaviour and sentenced to 30 months in prison. She described the evidence in that case as so overwhelming that for the children to have contact with the father would cause them significant emotional harm as:

"*(49) The F has been highly abusive of the M, as is proven by the fact of his criminal conviction and the very significant sentence that that the Crown Court imposed.*

(50) Further, the probation report makes clear that he has neither shown any remorse for his conduct, nor any understanding of the impact that it has had, and continues to have, on the M and the children. His response appears to be to deny that he committed the offence and have no insight into his conduct. …

(51) The Probation Service has assessed the F as being a high risk both to the M and to his current partner. I place great weight on their assessment, given that they will have had extensive contact with the F both before and during his imprisonment.

(52) 1 also place great weight on [the Cafcass officer's] assessment that the F having any contact with the children would be emotionally damaging to them, given his past and present conduct.

(53) For all those reasons I conclude not merely that the children should live with the M but that the F should have no contact, whether direct or indirect with the children. I have very little doubt that if I ordered indirect contact the F would use that to find the M and then to try to manipulate or frighten her into giving contact with the children. The negative impact on the M would, on the facts of this case, be harmful to the children."

ANALYSIS/DECISIONS

Welfare

34. C is too young to express clear wishes and feelings, but I have no doubt that she will be missing M.

35. There is no suggestion that C's physical, emotional and educational needs are not being met by his father. M told Cafcass that she has no concerns over C's basic care and I have no reason to doubt that F is capable of meeting C's care needs at present.

36. C has had no contact with M for around 9 months. This is a long time in her short life and the continued absence of M is likely to continue to cause her emotional harm. This

must be considered in light of the fact that she is a victim of domestic abuse and the emotional harm that would have caused her, whether or not she remembers M's behaviour. Further, C may have suffered indirectly as a result of the effect on F of the domestic abuse impairing his capacity to care for her (and the risk of further harm if he is re-traumatised by contact arrangements as he suggests, or if contact is used to perpetuate domestic abuse).

37. C has Asian heritage from M, and M suggests this is a significant stage for her to develop an understanding of her religious (Buddhism), cultural and linguistic heritages. The CAFA reports M being of Asian/British heritage and F an Eastern European/British Catholic. M told the social worker that she seeks to convert to 'Church of England' and have C christened.

38. In considering the range of powers available to the court, I could make no order (and should do so if that is in C's best interests), or make the uncontested PSO, SIO and 'lives with' orders and consider making further orders as sought by either party.

Contact

39. Professionally supervised contact may well have continued had M not been imprisoned. It is presently not an option. M did not seek to challenge F's evidence that he would be re-traumatised by reading letters she wrote for C, or hearing her voice in a recording or call. Neither party were able to suggest third parties who may be able to assist. M is unable to afford to use contact centre services to assist with reading letters to C (which F opposed in any event due to the burden and perhaps trauma of taking C to a contact centre for this purpose). F was not asked to fund contact centre services and there is a strong presumption in any event against ordering a victim of domestic abuse to pay for contact between a child and the abusive parent.

40. I suggested that F might send periodic updates about C to M. F opposed this on that basis that it was an onerous task in light of the serious domestic abuse conviction and fear that M would use this against him, at least until she had completed a DAPP.

41. It was accepted that a recital be included in my order to the effect that it is expected that nursery/school would provide to M, as a parent with PR, the usual updates provided to absent parents.

42. Although not canvassed with the parents, I see no reason why F cannot keep some of the drawings and perhaps photographs that will inevitably come home from nursery/school in a 'memory box' for M, to be given to her on the next occasion of direct contact. I consider this to be in C's best interests.

43. In my judgment, at least whilst M is in prison, the emotional need of C to have contact with M is outweighed by the risk of emotional harm that may result from such contact, if not directly to C by M's behaviour, then at least indirectly by re-traumatising F and so causing indirect harm to C. This applies equally to direct contact in prison (which is not sought at this time) as to indirect contact, including periodic updates.

44. M does not oppose my making a PSO prohibiting her from removing C from the care of the F or any person or institution (including any nursery or school) to whom he has entrusted C's care, or instructing or encouraging anybody else to do so. Whilst M is

currently in prison, and unable to remove C herself, I consider it necessary and proportionate to make the order now in light of telling the court that she is seeking release on temporary licence and home detention curfew ahead of her formal release date, and the fact that her parents are said to have attended C's nursery demanding to see C.

45. Further, given my decision in paragraph 43, in my judgment it is necessary and proportionate to the risk of harm for me to make a further PSO, prohibiting M from contacting C directly or indirectly. I will attach a penal notice to both of these orders.

46. M does not oppose F making the schooling application and it is necessary and proportionate that I made an SIO to that effect to enable him to do so.

Dismissal/final-order

47. M's counsel sought to distinguish between the caselaw set out at paragraphs 27-28 above and this present case on the basis that the court in those matters made decisions after long-running proceedings and/or earlier proceedings, during which judges had already had the opportunity to assess the evidence and the parents, consider the advice of Cafcass, and determine the merits of each parent's position.

48. On my reading of the caselaw there is no reason why long-running proceedings and/or earlier proceedings are required before a judge can properly make a final order, even at a FHDRA. It would not be possible in all circumstances, but in this case I have had a full opportunity to assess the evidence of the parents, consider the advice of Cafcass, and determine the merits of each parent's position.

49. I have had the benefit of the parties' witness statements and attached evidence (51 pages attached in M's case), Local Authority and Cafcass evidence, disclosure from the criminal proceedings and extensive contact notes. Both parties are represented by experienced counsel who provided written and oral submissions, with no suggestion that there had been insufficient time available to prepare or make full submissions. There is accordingly in my judgment nothing to be gained by listing a further or final hearing. There has been no suggestion that there would be any more to be said or considered by doing so and neither counsel sought to cross examine the other party or put in further evidence.

50. Further, whilst M remains in prison, in my judgment there is nothing to be gained from seeking a report under section 7 of the Children Act from Cafcass. C is too young to provide wishes and feelings that carry significant weight beyond that she is likely to miss her mother. It is not sufficient justification for such a report that Cafcass may, as M suggests, be able to recommend practicable means of contact that neither party, their counsel, or I have been able to suggest during the hearing.

51. M appears to proceed under the misapprehension that proceedings would need to remain ongoing for her to be referred to a DAPP and to receive a psychological assessment. Cafcass are no longer able to make referrals to a DAPP course. The only option would be to undertake a suitable private course that M must find and fund herself (usually a Respect accredited course of around 26 weeks, at some considerable cost, or potentially through the A Project which is free of charge but requires participants to not have been subject to private law proceedings for at least 12 months).

Similarly, a psychological assessment, if directed by the court on a party's application, is something she (or the parties together if so ordered) would be required to fund.

52. M raised concern that her Article 6 rights (under the European Convention on Human Rights) would be infringed by making a final order in this hearing. In my judgment I have a broad discretion and making a final order is in accordance with that discretion and the FPR and caselaw as set out above. I have approached this matter with the welfare of C being paramount and in accordance with principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child. In doing so I reject the submission that M has not had a fair hearing.

53. For these reasons, M's application lacks sufficient merit (whilst in prison) to justify pursuing. It is in C's best interest that a final order is made now.

Section 91(14) order

54. The test for a section 91(14) order in this case is clearly met: a period of respite is needed following litigation and since the domestic abuse that led to M's conviction; M accepts that she needs to complete a DAPP following her custodial sentence before contact can progress (at least beyond supervised contact); and to protect the welfare of C, at least indirectly due to the effect on F of further litigation.

55. The court has discretion as to the appropriate length of the order. Whilst Lieven J (as she then was) made an order for 5 years in relation to a similar domestic abuse conviction in *Ms X v Mr Y*, in the present case M was having supervised contact for a lengthy period prior to her sentence of imprisonment.

56. If M seeks supervised contact upon her release and F does not agree, then she may well wish to begin proceedings. All I can say with any certainty at this point is that Cafcass are highly unlikely to recommend unsupervised contact before M has completed a DAPP.

57. For these reasons I consider that it is proportionate to the potential harm that the section 91(14) order remain in place only until M is released from prison.

CONCLUSIONS/FURTHER ORDERS

58. Having considered all of the documents in the trial bundle and had the benefit of hearing submissions on behalf of both parties, I have reached the clear conclusion that C should live with F and have no contact with M, in the particular circumstances of this case. I do not anticipate that this will be in C's best interests for long, but that is largely in M's own hands. She will need to demonstrate genuine insight and change.

59. I grant permission to disclose a copy of my order to C's nursery/school, GP, any government body, including any local authority, and any other professional working with C for her safety and welfare. I also grant permission for M to disclose the order to her own GP and a DAPP provider and any professional working with her.

60. If/when M begins a DAPP, the DAPP provider must also be provided with a copy of both court bundles for this hearing and the final court order made today.